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Nuclear Deterrence Theory

Name: Nuclear Deterrence Theory
Brand: Cambridge University Press
SKU: 04090059
Price: 48.14 EUR
Availability: InStock
Author: Robert Powell
ISBN: 9780521063999

Robert Powell

Language

English

Book Paperback

Libristo code: 04090059

Publishers Cambridge University Press, June 2008

Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foun... Full description

Libristo code: 04090059

116 b

48.14 €

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Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to explore some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory, including the effects of first-strike advantages, limited retaliation, and the number of nuclear powers in the international system on the dynamics of escalation. With the formalizations he develops, the author is able to demonstrate the fundamental similarity of the two seemingly disparate deterrrent strategies that have evolved in response to the nuclear revolution and the condition of mutually assured destruction: the strategy of limited retaliation. The author argues that the logic underlying both strategies centres on a search for ways to make the use of force or the threat of its use credible when any use of force might escalate to mutual devastation.